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PHILOSOPHY MUSIC |
THE MUSIC IN MY PHILOSOPHY
Music has not been as prominent in philosophy or
as influential in aesthetics as the visual arts, at least in the Western
tradition. Reflecting on my years of experience as both a philosopher and a
musician, I am increasingly intrigued by speculating if and how today’s
aesthetic discourse might have taken a different direction if music been its central
focus. It is tempting to wonder whether, in some cases, the musical art may
indeed have had an influence, even if less conspicuous than some other arts. The hidden presence of music on philosophy struck
me years ago when teaching Bergson’s “An Introduction to Metaphysics.” Bergson
was particularly fond of music and knowledgeable about it, and the influence of
musical experience may be recognized in his distinction between relative and
absolute ways of knowing a thing. Relative knowledge, he held, comes from our
external relations to an object, whereas absolute knowledge is acquired by directly
entering into it.[1]
Bergson’s characterization of absolute knowing bears a close resemblance to
musical experience. But apart from the content of “An Introduction to
Metaphysics,” I discovered a more recondite but profound musical influence on
Bergson’s essay. Its structure bears a striking resemblance to what in music
is known as sonata-allegro form, commonly used for the first movements of
symphonies, concerti, sonatas, and other standard compositional types of the
classical repertory. Exposition, development, and recapitulation of thematic
materials, followed by a coda, are the basic components of sonata-allegro form,
and Bergson’s essay embodies an identical structure. I have no idea whether Bergson’s metaphysical
sonata was fashioned deliberately. And while I have studied and played music nearly
every day from the age of twelve and have degrees from a major music
conservatory, I had not until now thought to consider whether music might have
had something of a similar influence on my own philosophical work. Both
passions have co-existed in mostly separate domains. For most of my life I
seemed to have lived in two worlds, pursuing each on its own terms. In one I
taught piano and music theory, performed with orchestra as piano soloist,
organized and played in a chamber music group that gave concerts for nine years,
and performed as an accompanist and soloist. I have also composed songs and
instrumental music, including the chamber ballet, “Theodora,” one of whose productions
was in 1979 for the ASA meeting at the Banff Center in Canada, in which several
members of the Society played in the instrumental ensemble. But as I look over my philosophical work, which
includes eight published books and numerous papers, I am struck by music’s
inconspicuousness. Only a handful of my essays are on music. In fact, among
my philosophical colleagues, few are aware of my musical background, and on
only rare occasions have I included performance as part of a presentation at an
aesthetics meeting. The most notable instance was at the XVII International
Congress of Aesthetics in Ankara, Turkey in 2007, where, at the invitation of
the organizer, Jale Erzen, who long before had become acquainted with my
musical interests, I offered an artist’s presentation. This presentation combined
the performance of several works involving piano with a formal paper called
“What Titles Don’t Tell.” In that presentation I played (on the piano) some
eighteenth century harpsichord pieces, Schumann’s Kinderscenen, and lastly
Roussel’s Jouers de Flûte with the talented young Turkish flautist, Onur
Türkes. This presentation surprised many of the international colleagues I had
known for years and yet who had no inkling of my musical background. Only in
the last year or two have I given deliberate thought to the relationship between
my musical and philosophical worlds, and now, for the first time, have begun to
articulate it. This process led me to some unexpected associations.
“The aesthetic field,” the central idea (and title) of my first book,[2] reflects, I
think, the contextual character of musical experience in recognizing the
interdependent collaboration of composer, musical sound, audience, and
performer that constitute the four dimensions of the aesthetic field. At the
time of its publication in 1970, the importance of performance was not
generally recognized in the current aesthetic literature, and this book was one
of the first works in recent times to give it a central place. The
correspondence of the aesthetic field with the musical situation was not
deliberate but rather circumstantial, and only recently has the resemblance
become clear to me. Another musical influence, equally central, appears
in the concept of aesthetic engagement, which I first developed in my
book, Art and Engagement (1991), and subsequently refined in other
essays and books. Offered as a clear alternative to Kant’s aesthetic
disinterestedness, the idea of aesthetic engagement formulates what, at the
same time, is central to musical experience, at least in my own practice as a
performer and listener. To be sure, that was not the motive for developing the
idea. Rather, I had been struck by the practices in the contemporary arts that
subverted the dualism of art object and appreciator, deliberately breaching
their separation. I had first noted the significance of this transgression in
a paper I published in the JAAC in 1970 called "Aesthetics and the
Contemporary Arts," and am now gratified that this observation anticipated
what has taken many forms to become one of the most conspicuous trends in
contemporary art, from audience participation in theater, fiction, and other
arts, to relational art, performance art, and the growing interest in the
aesthetics of everyday life. Musical experience, like the appreciative
experience of dance and film, has, I think, always invited aesthetic
engagement, which is why I continue to wonder what would have been the
consequences for aesthetic theory if music, rather than painting, with its
apparent (but misleading) dualism of object and viewer, had been taken as the
paradigmatic art. In the last thirty years and more, environmental
aesthetics has become an important focus in contemporary aesthetics, attracting
international and interdisciplinary attention. Both Finland and China have
hosted multiple conferences on the topic that included a wide range of international
participants, and environmental philosophy, as well as the environmental
movement, has recognized the relevance of aesthetics. As one of the early contributors
to the development of this side of the discipline, I am pleased at the attention
and influence environmental aesthetics has generated. In the context of my comments
here, I am led to wonder whether there are any additional ways in which
influences and parallels are discernible between music and environmental
aesthetics. There is, of course, the observation that music
may be thought of as an environmental art. This characteristic of music has
been exploited in obvious ways. Songs and dances in traditional cultures are
characteristically used to influence weather patterns, and music is employed today
to promote environmental awareness and action, from the UN Music &
Environment Initiative to folk singers. I suspect that music provides more here than a causal
or rhetorical contribution, and that part of its influence could stem from its inherent
environmental character. For example, it is misleading to localize music in
the performer. Doing so confuses its source with its perception. Even though
most musical production has a directional character, musical sound has a
powerful ambient quality. In an acoustically successful concert hall, sound
surrounds the listener, the hall acting as a great resonating chamber. This ambience
of musical experience has long been recognized. Antiphonal singing has been
used since antiquity and occurs in the liturgical and folk music of many
cultures. In the sixteenth century Andrea and Giovanni Gabrieli used
antiphonal choirs of voices and instruments in the great resonant space of St.
Mark’s Cathedral, which has two opposed choir lofts, to create what became celebrated
as the Venetian antiphonal style, and in the eighteenth century Bach was one of
many composers to use divided choirs. These are but illustrious examples of a
common practice that makes artistic use of music’s environmental character, a
practice that continues to the present day. It’s not my intention to digress into musical
aesthetics as such, but rather to reflect on whether the ambient character of
musical experience has some resemblance to environmental perception more
generally. The way in which my work in environmental aesthetics has developed may
have some parallel in the music I have engaged in daily. For example, I try
always to distinguish between ‘environment’ and ‘the environment’ and I
find the difference crucial. The environment objectifies the setting of
spatial experience; it turns environment into an object distinct from the
perceiver. However, the ecological and behavioral sciences, as well as
personal perception, recognize the continuity of humans and the setting of
which we are a part. There is no dividing separation or barrier. Rather,
lines of influence radiate in all directions, from sound and space to the
mutual influence of humans and the things and activities in which we engage. There
are certainly perceptual foci in environmental experience, and so, too, do
these occur in musical experience. And as our conception of environment has enlarged
to include the built environment and social relations, along with the many
intangibles of experience, so musical sound has expanded to encompass the
ambient sounds of urban and everyday life, sometimes in musical form, sometimes
literally. One can cite numerous twentieth-century examples, the most notorious
(and overworked) one being John Cage’s 4’33” (1952), consisting entirely
of chance environmental sounds, but Gershwin’s An American in Paris imitates
traffic sounds, Honneger’s "mouvement symphonique" Pacific 231
(1923) evokes a steam locomotive, while Saint-Saën’s Danse macabre
reaches its climax with the cock’s crowing. Of course, the classic
example is the musical rendering in Beethoven’s Sixth (Pastoral) Symphony
of the flowing water of a brook, peasant dancing and revelry, the passage of a
thunderstorm and the shepherds’ joyful song of thanksgiving. Music may have had a still more subtle influence
of on my philosophical work. There are probably as many ways of writing music
as there are of writing philosophy. Having done both, I detect a personal resemblance
in method and sensibility, and the idea is worth pursuing in its own right wherever
it may lead. I am hardly the first to consider philosophical writing an art. In the last few years I have come to recognize
the central place of sensibility in aesthetics. Indeed, I think of aesthetics
as the theory of sensibility: the study of the central role of perceptual
discrimination, of sensory nuance and resonance in our engagement with the
various arts and with environment under the unique conditions of each circumstance.
I think sensibility is a powerful factor and an essential guide in the creative
activity of artists and composers, just as sensibility guides perceptual
attention in appreciation. Sensitivity to the perceptual possibilities and
demands of music, as of any art, guides the development of the musical materials
and encourages coherence. In any case, I have come to recognize that similar
processes play a critical part in my philosophical writing as they have in my
music, and I expect that I am not alone in benefitting from their aesthetic and
philosophic mutuality. As for the relation itself of music and
philosophy that I’ve been considering here, does it designate an influence, a
common way of thinking, or something else? Perhaps it would be better not to
trivialize the resemblance by attempting a simplistic explanation, causal or
otherwise. So I end, as philosophy began, in wonder and admiration at both
music and philosophy as striking instances of the creative interpenetration of
all the factors in the aesthetic field. Whereas philosophy, Schopenhauer had claimed,
can convey the inner nature of the world only in general concepts, music
expresses the inner being of the world, the will, distinctly and directly,[3] so that “the
most philosophical sensibility will be a musical sensibility.”[4] [1] Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 21. [2] The Aesthetic Field, A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (Springfield, IL: CC Thomas, 1970). [3] Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (1859) (The Falcon’s Wing Press, 1958), Vol. I, p. 264-5. [4] Robert Wicks, “Arthur Schopenhauer,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011,5.1. Accessed 23 July 2012. Ibid., Note 11. |